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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STArfE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 
9265 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT JOSEPH ERSOL BERCHTOLD 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 15th, 1959, one Joseph E. Berchtold and his 
friend of long standing, Joseph Van Forrest, both of Brigham 
City, Utah, left Brigham City in the late afternoon for Cache 
Valley, arriving in Logan at approximately 7 o'clock p.m., 
(Tr. 412). From Logan they drove around for a while and 
then drove north in Berchtold's 1959 Chevrolet automobile 
to Smithfield and then west to Newton where Mr. Forrest 
had a girl friend by the name of Nora Jean Christensen 
.3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Tr. 413). Mr. Forrest went into her home on arrival and 
brought her out to the car where she was introduced for the 
first time to the defendant Berchtold and from there they 
started east toward Smithfield to pick up a blind date (Tr. 414) 
for the defendant. As they drove east (Tr. 413) the defen-
dant was driving, the Christensen girl in the center with Mr. 
Forrest on the right. All were in the front seat. As they went 
in the direction of Smithfield there is a bridge over the Bear 
River that must be crossed. It is approximately seven miles 
east of Newton with the road fairly straight (Tr. 413). As 
the car proceeded east and was close to the point where the 
bridge was built across the river (Tr. 414): 
... Van and Nora Jean was up in the light of the 
radio looking at his Thiokol badge. They had it in 
their hand and the light of the radio was the only light 
in the car other than the dashboard. But they were 
looking at it and seeing his picture on it, and it was-
Nora Jean stated to me that if we didn't hurry that 
this-I can't remember her name for sure. I think said 
Rosie or something, would be in bed if we didn't get 
over there quite fast, and I guess she maybe got kind 
of bored that we weren't in any hurry. I never felt any 
hurry in my mind. I was just enjoying the evening and 
she-
Q. What did you do then at that time? 
A. I picked up my speed probably up to forty-five 
or fifty-five at the most. 
Q. And what did you reach at that time by way of 
change of route or anything? 
A. We came to the first corner of the bridge and 
then down over it to the bridge. 
Q. Came down over the bridge? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you know how fast you were going when 
you came down over the bridge? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You never looked at the speedometer at that 
time? 
A. No. 
Q. What did you do as you came down across the 
bridge, if you know? 
A. Well, as I came down to the bridge, as I hit the 
bridge I brightened my lights to see which way the 
road went, out of instinct, and I probably let my foot 
off the gas out of instinct. As I came to the corner I 
was a little in doubt as to which way the road went. 
Q. Had you been over the road earlier that evening, 
the same road ? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was it dark when you came over it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it dark when you went back? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you ever been over that road before? 
A. No. 
Q. Those were the only two times in your life; ts 
that correct? 
A. Yes, I've been there since. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. As I came to the corner I was a little in doubt, 
like I say. 
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Q. A little in doubt about what? 
A. Which way the road went, other than if-I fig-
ured that we were going back straight east when we 
came to the corner. I didn't know for sure, and so I 
kind of had it in my mind that the road went on 
straight, but when I brightened my lights I could see 
there was a corner. 
Q. Go ahead then. 
A. As I got to the corner I could see that the road 
went left, and as I turned I was in the gravel and I 
could feel my back end going a little sideways on the 
back end, and I could hear the gravel hitting the 
back of the car, as the tire hits it up into the splash pan, 
I could hear that. And I could, you know, I could feel 
myself going in a skid and I possibly-
Q. WT as it a violent skid? 
A. No, it wasn't really too bad then. 
Q. Well, was that the first feeling of any give of 
your car up to that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say you heard the gravel at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then what took place? 
A. Well, I turned the wheels, started trying to fight 
-well, I wasn't really too worried, but I tried to kind 
of fight it and I was turning the wheel. And then all 
of a sudden it seemed like I possibly hit my brakes or 
something and it seemed like I locked it sideways off 
the road. I could see my lights turn around, and then 
all of a sudden they flipped in the air. Then I can't 
ren1ember anything until after I stopped. 
Q. Was there any screaming or yelling or warning? 
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A. No, there wasn't. Nobody said anything. I think 
they still were down in the radio lights looking at the 
badge. 
Q. Did you feel like at any time up to the point 
where you-
MR. CALDERWOOD: I object to the form of 
the question. 
MR. MANN: He's the only one that can state it. 
MR. CALDERWOOD: I object to what he feels. 
Q. -that your car was under control? 
MR. CALDERWOOD: Oh, I object to that. 
THE COURT: He may answer that. 
A. Would you please repeat it? 
Q. Did you feel like your car was entirely under 
control up to the time that you hit the gravel? 
A. Definitely. 
Q. Did you feel that you were going at an excessive 
rate of speed up to the time you hit the gravel? 
A. No. 
This statement of facts leading up to the accident made 
at the time of trial should be compared with the written 
statement given to Officer Bair, defendant's Exhibit No. 26, 
from a hospital bed the following morning. Basically the 
only difference was the speed where on the T r. page 415 line 
10, it states: 
C( ••• I picked up my speed probably up to forty-five 
of fifty-five at the most." 
The driving speed claimed (Tr. 414-7) prior to any 
acceleration was 40-45. However, (Tr. 422-30) the defendant 
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was asked about the speed stated in Exhibit No. 26, which is as 
follows: 
C(Q. Now one question I wanted to ask you. I note 
that in here, C(It looked straight, but as I came down 
at approximately sixty-five miles an hour." Did you 
know how fast you were coming down to this bridge 
as a fact? Did you check your speedometer? 
A. No. 
Q. Why did you put that you came down approxi-
mately sixty-five miles an hour? 
A. I don't ... I never did have any idea in speed 
in my mind. I don't remember any time stating any 
speed other than approximately. I don't know why I 
put it approximately sixty-five. Maybe it's just because 
everybody up there, uy ou were going fast or some-
thing, wasn't you?" or something like that. 
Q. Had people been telling you that you must have 
been speeding? 
.A. Yes." 
Mr. Bair claimed however (Tr. 51) that the defendant 
said he was going about 70 over the bridge. The defendant 
(Tr. 424-7) stated: 
C(Q. Now, you heard Officer Bair say that you told 
him that you were driving seventy miles an hour when 
he first talked to you. Do you remember any conver-
sation with Mr. Bair where you told him you were 
driving seventy miles an hour? 
A. No. I says I don't think I could have possibly 
been going more than seventy miles an hour. I never 
stated the speed of seventy miles an hour. 
Q. What made you say, '] don't think I could 
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miles an hour" ? Had there been other conversations 
about speed at that time? 
A. Well, he'd asked me how fast I was going, and 
I says I didn't know, and he says, "Well, you must 
have"-\vell, no, he didn't say anything. I got the 
implication that maybe he was meaning I was going 
quite fast, and I just said, "Well, I don't think I could 
have been possibly going more than seventy miles an 
hour." 
It should also be compared with Officer Bair's testimony 
of what the defendant said immediately after the accident at 
the scene about speed, the curve and loose gravel (Tr. 52, 
lines 10-20). 
Some beer had been purchased at Brigham City in un-
opened bottles. After the girl got in the car at Newton a 
bottle was opened up and handed to the defendant (Tr. 425-
18) and he stuck it between his legs. When asked by the officer 
if he would submit to a blood test (Tr. 25) he readily agreed. 
Officer Bair testified when asked by the District Attorney 
(Tr. 50-11) that the tests showed the defendant was not 
intoxicated. No test was introduced by the State so we must 
conclude it had no evidentiary value. 
The bridge and the road, before and after, must be 
described. The road leading east from Newton is a standard 
width, oiled surface country road, approximately 22 to 23 feet 
wide and fairly straight until you come to the vicinity of the 
bridge. Defendant's Exhibit No. 29 shows this road as you 
approach the bridge going east. The bridge is lower in elevation 
and on a straight line with the road from the west. Plaintiff's 
Exhibits No. 4 and 6 further illustrate the character of the 
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road and bridge as you get nearer to it and the left turn on 
the other side can be plainly seen because it is daytime, but 
would present a different problem at night. Plaintiff's Exhibits 
No. 7 and 8 show the road, as you come out on the east side 
of the bridge and you can then see that there is a hard sur-
faced road that swings to the right as well as one that swings 
to the left with loose gravel up in the "Y" that is created 
by the two roads forking away from the one road on the east 
side of the bridge. Pictures of this loose gravel were avoided 
by the State when they took their pictures some week or so 
after the accident, but Mr. Berchtold Sr. (Tr. 351-2) went 
to the scene of the accident on the morning of April 17th, 1959, 
with a number of people with cameras and pictures were 
taken. He had been in Washington, D.C. on an assignment 
with the Air Force and did not arrive home until late on the 
evening of the 16th day of April, 1959 (Tr. 355). He searched 
for marks upon the highway (Tr. 355) and found some marks 
that are shown in defendant's Exhibit No. 24 (Tr. 356) and 
there were other sets to the left of them, see defendant's 
Exhibit No. 25, but none leading off the road to point of 
accident. Officer Bair said that he and Officer Lee made test 
skids on April 16th (Tr. 101-28): 
((Q. Let me ask you, where did you make these tests? 
A. Directly over the marks that were visible on 
the highway. 
Q. Directly over the same marks? 
A. Yes, sir." 
There are three exhibits of the defendant that show the 
road as it looked on the morning of April 17th from the east 
10 
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side looking westerly toward the bridge. One is defendant's 
Exhibit No. 35, looking in a straight line at the bridge which 
puts the camera in loose gravel and to the left of the road that 
goes to Smithfield. Defendant's Exhibit No. 24 which moves 
the camera to the right, toward the Smithfield road, but still 
in loose rocks and gravel, and defendant's Exhibit No. 25 
which is further east, down the south side of the Smithfield 
road showing the bridge, the intersection with the road going 
to the south of the Smithfield road, the gravel and the tire 
marks of the officer's car. Defendant's Exhibit No. 28 is a 
picture taken at a little different angle of this same scene. 
Reversing the camera and looking east from the loose gravel, 
defendant's Exhibit No. 31, shows three main telephone poles 
in the background with the one on the left being darker and 
it is the pole that has been replaced. Defendant's Exhibits 
No. 30, 32 and 33 are progressive pictures made with the 
camera being moved east, each successive time, toward the 
pole that has been replaced. 
On the evening in question, the defendant approached 
the bridge in his car with the other two people beside him. 
He admitted that he increased his speed just shortly before 
reaching the bridge upon the suggestion of one of the other 
passengers (Tr. 52). He does not know the exact speed that 
he was travelling when he reached the bridge, but felt that 
everything was under control until he became disturbed on 
which way the road turned after he started across the bridge 
{Tr. 52). That he struck some loose gravel at which time he 
made his turn to the left and found he was in trouble, thought 
he had straightened it out, but all of a sudden it seemed like 
he possibly hit his brake and something took hold of it as it 
11 
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was coming out and in just a moment he was off the road 
and into the barow pit and the pleasant evening that was 
being enjoyed several seconds before turned into a tragedy. 
At the trial, the State, through Officer Bair, contended 
that there were certain skid marks upon the highway (Tr. 3 7-
22). That he marked them with a red crayon where they began 
and ended (Tr. 42-6). He claimed that the two marks were left 
by the right side wheels of an automobile (Tr. 43-22). He said 
they were two inches wide almost identical expect in length 
(Tr. 44-3). He said they were eight inches apart (Tr. 44-25). 
That he returned about noon the following day (Tr. 59-29). 
That he was alone (Tr. 60-2). That he used a clip board and 
a 100-foot tape ( T r. 60-16) . That he measured both marks 
(Tr. 62-15). One started twenty inches prior to the other 
(Tr. 62-32). That the one mark (the right one) had a total 
length of 57 feet 10 inches before it went off the road (Tr. 
62-27). The other mark started 20 inches after and had 77 feet 
six inches contact with the road before it left the same (Tr. 
63-4). He claimed they were eight inches apart (Tr. 63-19). 
On voir dire (Tr. 66-18) he was asked what leaves the mark 
or what is the mark composed of that is left on the road and 
we have: 
A. The mark is made of the tire, the heat of the 
tire against the surface of the road. 
Q. And you can get it from slowing the wheel less 
than free wheeling? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Or you can get it from a side skid? 
A. Yes, sir. 
12 
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Q. Or you can get it from clear locking of the 
wheel? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Officer Bair said he measured the distance from where 
the tire marks, or first tire, left the road into the barrow pit to 
the first impact (Tr. 71-29) and it was 80 feet 10 inches to 
some small trees. From the trees to a telephone pole further 
east (T r. 72) it was 53 feet even and from there to where the 
car came to rest further east it was 69 feet. The width of the 
road varied from 22 feet 6 inches to 23 feet and was 22 feet 
10 inches where the car left the road (Tr. 74). His measure-
ments from the bridge, east, are given (Tr. 76). Straight across 
the bridge the road is straight 200 ft., it is 332 ft. to the west 
edge of the road turning right toward Benson and 639 feet 
to the east side of this road that turns to Benson and 819 ft. 
would be the measurement along the right side of the road 
to the pole that was broken on the second impact. He prepared 
a map, Exhibit No. 14, of a scale of one inch to ten feet. He 
indicated the route of travel on this exhibit but said Tr. 79-28) : 
A. The vehicle as it struck the pole changed its 
course. It went from a right side bank slide into a left. 
Q. The left side of the car then being the forward 
part going sideways ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With the left side of the car being ahead? 
.A. At this point here after impact in this area here, 
the vehicle changed directions." 
This is further emphasized (Tr. 87-7): 
13 
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A. Yes, but, as I say, the car was going sideways 
leaving gouges in the gravel as it went off .... " 
On his Exhibit No. 14 he shows the two purported tire 
marks and says that from where the marks started they were 
to the left of the right edge of the oiled surface 4 ft. 6 inches 
(Tr. 84-14). 
Officer Bair said that Officer Lee helped him re-check his 
measurements the afternoon of the day following the accident 
(Tr. 89). They then attempted to take some measurements 
of a cord 55 feet long along the purported . mark of 57 ft. 
10 inches ( T r. 91-94) and claimed that from the middle ordi-
nate of his cord to the tire mark was 4 inches. No measurements 
of any purported cord of the 77 foot 6 inch tire mark was made 
even though they were working with a 100-foot tape and why 
a 55-foot cord was used no one knows. These two lines, or 
right side tire marks of the vehicle, which, when analyzed have 
some very peculiar characteristics become the basis of their 
evidence.· They admit the right mark of the two is the right rear 
wheel and the left one the front. They admit that there is a 
distance of 10 feet between the front and rear wheel which 
would mean that if they both commenced to lay down marks 
at the same instant there would be a distance of 10 feet instead 
of 20 inches between the beginning of the two marks. In addi-
tion to the measurements that were purported to be taken of 
the tire marks, Officer Bair had a photographer take a picture 
of them the night of the accident. They were not offered in by 
the State but were by the defendant, Exhibits No. 22 and 23, 
and Officer Bair could not identify any tire marks in them. 
They admit and testify that the first mark began 4 feet 6 inches 
to the left of the oiled surface (Tr. 84-14) and ran off the oiled 
14 
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surface in 57 feet 10 inches which would make a triangle with 
a base of 4 feet 6 inches if the edge of the oiled surface was 
a continuous straight line. Also they allege that the other tire 
was 8 inches further left and ran off the road 77 feet 6 inches 
up the road which would make a triangle with a base of 
5 feet 2 inches if the oiled surface was a continuous straight 
line. However, and this is very important, the edge of the oiled 
surface was on a curve (see plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14 and 
defendant's Exhibit No. 36). To show the true base of a 
triangle Officers Lee and Bair were requested to plat on a 
large piece of paper on the floor in front of the jury (Tr. 130 to 
154), defendant's Exhibit No. 21 and to do so they were asked 
to draw a straight line along the south side of the road on 
Exhibit No. 14 going westerly from a point east from where 
the wheels of the car left the road. This straight line to rep-
resent the south edge of the oiled surface, if the road were 
straight and not on a curve and from that line they then 
measured to the north to where they had plotted the first 
mark of the tire on Exhibit No. 14 and they had 12 feet (Tr. 
133-7). This was then plotted on defendant's Exhibit No. 21 
and the left tire mark was plotted 8 inches to the left and 
20 inches up which established a true base of a right triangle. 
The distances where each tire left the edge of the road was 
then platted and lines drawn showing the height of one triangle 
approximately 22 feet greater than the other, all to a scale of 
one inch equals one foot. It was then demonstrated the physical 
impossibility of the right front wheel staying 8 inches parallel 
to the right rear wheel until the right rear wheel left the road 
and the right front wheel continuing up the road another 
22 feet before leaving especially when the right front wheel 
15 
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is ahead, due to wheel base of 119 inches or approximately 
10 feet (Tr. 153-13). Officer Bair admitted (Tr. 153, lines 
19-26) that if the car were travelling on a true circle that the 
front wheel would have to be on the gravel portion of the road 
when the rear wheel was laying its mark down at the end of 
his 55-foot cord. With that admission, all of Dr. Wood's 
testin1ony, as will be shown later in the argument, was strictly 
speculative. 
In addition, Officer Bair, on the same day that he was 
supposed to have taken all of the measurements of the pur-
ported tire marks, filed his official report with the State of 
Utah, defendant's Exhibit No. 27, besides other things he said: 
((No solid brake marks visible prior to leaving road 
surface." 
Our pictures shown as Exhibits 24, 25, 28 and 36, taken 
the 17th show the officers tire marks laid down the 16th, but 
could not pick up any other except the officer's. 
Now, to the pleadings, the information charges: (R. 5) 
((That on or about the 15th day of April, 1959, at the 
County of Cache, State of Utah, the said defendant 
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully drive and 
operate a motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the 
safety of others by which one Nora Jean Christensen 
received injury and whose death ensued within one 
year as a proximate result of said in jury, contrary to 
the provisions of the Statute of the State aforesaid, in 
such cases made and provided, and against the peace 
and dignity of the State of Utah." 
To this a demand for a bill of particulars was made (R. 6) 
and nparticularly as to what acts, if any, the defendant is 
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alleged to have done so as to drive a motor vehicle in a reck-
less disregard of the safety of others." The bill of particulars, 
as furnished ( R. 9) set out: 
·'The defendant is alleged to have driven his motor 
vehicle in excess of seventy miles per hour in the 
nighttime on a road of such a route, course and condi-
tion with respect to width and curvature as existed at 
and near the time and place of the injury resulting in 
Nora Jean Christensen's death, and by failing to drive 
under such conditions and in such a manner as to be 
able to keep the automobile he was operating under 
control and upon the traveled portion of the highway." 
A motion to quash was filed (R. 10) and argued (Tr. 
2, line 5 to page 5, line 20). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH FOR THE REASON 
THAT THE INFORMATION AS MODIFIED BY THE 
BILL OF PARTICULARS DOES NOT STATE A CRIMINAL 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR 
FAILURE TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION OR ERRED 
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
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STRUCTION NO. 1 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS 
TO-WIT: 
(a) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS 
WAS CONFLICTING. 
(b) THAT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OFFI-
CERS PRESENTED AND P AR'fiCULARL Y AS TO MEAS-
URE!\1ENTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN AT THE SCENE OF 
THE ACCIDENT WERE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 
BE AS ALLEGED. 
(c) THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS, A PHYSICIST 
OF THE USU, WAS BASED UPON A FALSE PREMISE, 
TO-WIT: THAT THE MARKS WERE LAID DOWN 
WHILE THE CAR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVEL-
lNG FREE OF SKIDS OR BRAKES ON THE CIRCUM-
FERENCE OF A PERFE~T CIRCLE FOR A DISTANCE OF 
A FIFTY FIVE FOOT CORD ON SAID CIRCUMFERENCE. 
(d) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS WAS 
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND CAUSED THE JURY TO 
BE INFLUENCED AND SPECULATE ON ITS VERDICT. 
(e) THAT THERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE REC-
ORD THAT THE DEFENDANT EVER EXCEEDED THE 
SPEED OF 65 MILES PER HOUR IN A POSTED 60 MILE 
DAY SPEED ZONE AND THEN SUCH SPEED WAS ONLY 
MOMENTARY. THAT SPEED ALONE OF THIS SLIGHT 
VARIATION FROM THE POSTED SPEED IS NOT {{RECK-
LESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.'' 
(f) THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF 
A MOMENTARY INDECISION OF THE DRIVER AFTER 
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HE REACHED GRAVEL DEPOSITS NEGLIGENTLY LEFT 
BY HIGHWAY OFFICIALS IN THE "Y" OF FORKING 
ROADS AS TO WHICH WAY THE ROAD WAS GOING. 
THAT SAID ACT WAS AT MOST NEGLIGENCE AND 
NOT HEEDLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF 
OTHERS. 
(g) THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD OF A HEEDLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY 
OF OTHERS IN THE DRIVING OF THE DEFENDANT. 
(h) THAT THE COURT, AFTER ALLOWING HIGH-
LY SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED TO 
THE JURY, WAS OBLIGATED TO TAKE SAID CASE 
FROM THE JURY TO PROHIBIT THEM FROM SPECU-
LATING IN MAKING THEIR DECISION. 
POINT III 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE, IN ITS ENTIRETY, DEFENDANT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID INSTRUC-
TION IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND THE 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH FOR THE REASON 
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THAT THE INFORMATION AS MODIFIED BY THE 
BILL OF PARTICULARS DOES NOT STATE A CRIMINAL 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
Our Section 41-6-43.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended reads: 
"41-6-43.1 0 Negligent homicide-Death occurring 
within one year-Penalty-Revocation of license or 
privilege to drive.-( a) When the death by any person 
ensues within 1 year as a proximate result of injury 
received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless dis-
regard of the safety of others, the person so operating 
such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide." 
In this regard the charge is: 
«(That on or about the 15th day of April, 1959, at 
the County of Cache, State of Utah the said defendant 
did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, drive and 
operate a motor vehicle in reckless disregard of the 
safety of others by which one Nora Jean Christensen 
received in jury and whose death ensued within one year 
as a proximate result of said injury, contrary to the pro-
visions of the Statute of the State aforesaid, in such 
cases made and provided, and -against the peace and 
dignity of the State of Utah." 
And then his bill of particulars is added: 
nThe defendant is alleged to have driven his motor 
vehicle in excess of 70 miles per hour in the night time 
on a road of such a route, course and condition with 
respect to width and curvature as existed at and near 
the time and place of the injury, resulting in death 
to Nora Jean Christensen, and that by failing to drive 
under such conditions in such a manner as to be able 
to keep the auton1obile he was operating under con-
trol, and upon the travelled portion of the highway." 
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He alleges two things, one, that he drove in excess of 70 
miles per hour in the night time and the other that he failed to 
keep his car under control and upon the travelled portion of 
the highway. Hem entioned something about width and curva-
ture, but nothing is set out and you cannot tell from the plead-
ings, whether the width is one foot or twenty or thirty feet; 
whether the curvature is based upon a radius of 100, 500, 
1000 or 1500 feet. The statute required the individual to be 
guilty of driving the vehicle in a reckless disregard of the 
safety of others. It is this recklessness that should have been 
set out, as was said in State vs. Adams, 12 5 P2d 430, left 
hand column, near the bottom: 
u ••• Criminal negligence therefore sufficient to satis-
fy arm (a) of the manslaughter definition means more 
than mere thoughtlessness or slight carelessness. It 
means reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked 
disregard for the safety of others." 
The bill of particulars did not clarify the issue, it just con-
fused the issue. As a matter of law an increase of up to 70 
miles an hour in and of itself is not reckless, disregard of the 
safety of others. There are no cases exactly in point on this, 
but we do have other cases where the matter has been gone 
into, such as the guest statute regarding civil liability. Our guest 
statute, Section 41-9-1- Utah Code Annotated 1953 reads in 
part: 
n ••• for injury to or death of such guest proximately 
resulting from the intoxication or wilful misconduct 
of such owner, driver or person responsible for the 
operation of such vehicle; . . . '' 
There have been numerous civil cases tried, particularly in 
surrounding states, where the guests have sued the owner and 
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alleged wilfull misconduct of such owner in his driving for 
the purpose of taking the matter out of the guest statute. In 
the cases to be cited hereinafter, speed in particular has been 
quite a factor. I use these cases because wilfull misconduct has 
been used similarly to the words ccreckless, disregard of the 
safety of others" and in civil cases if speed alone would not 
take it out of the guest statute, then most surely in a criminal 
case where intent must be proved or presumed from the acts, 
then a momentary increase of speed alone should not make a 
person guilty of the offense. 
A very interesting case is Roberts vs. Brown et al, Cali-
fornia February 7, 1949, 9 P2d 288. In this case the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour 
and he requested him to slow down and that he did slow down 
to 50 miles per hour and rolled the car over and the people 
were hurt. The court, on page 291, summarized a lot of cases 
that had been determined in California, and we have: 
tc (2) From the foregoing summary, it appears that 
the premise upon which plaintiff bases his claim of 
wilful misconduct of defendant is the speed at which 
defendant drove. Excessive speed alone, unattended by 
circumstances indicating an intention to injure, or a 
wanton disregard for the safety of, the guest, is in-
sufficient to constitute actionable wilful misconduct. 
The fact that a motorist in a Cord car raced at 73 
miles per hour, in a fog, drove on the left side of the 
highway near a Ctslow" sign to pass another speeding 
car and then returned to the right-hand lane where his 
Cord collided with a Dodge standing across the high-
way did not constitute wilful misconduct and judge-
ment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict should 
have been entered. McLeod v. Dutton, 13 Cal. App. 
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2d, 545, 57 P2d 189. Where a driver proceeded at 60 
miles per hour and the road was fifteen feet wide and 
was bounded by soft shoulders and the guest remon-
strated at the defendant's attempt to pass a car, defen-
dant continued laughing at and ignorant of her perils, 
it did not appear that she knew or should have known 
that injury was probable. Hall v. Mazzei, 14 Cal. App. 
2d 48, 57 P2d 948. A driver, 21 years of age, had been 
driving six years; he proceeded on a wet, slippery 
pavement at 35 miles per hour; his car, in good con-
dition, did not skid until he turned to avoid an ap-
proaching car when it ran off the highway and got out 
of his control and overturned. He thought he could 
drive safely but did not believe ccthat any serious 
injury was probable." Although he was mistaken and 
although cche may ... have disregarded the possible 
consequences of his act, such disregard was due to 
carelessness rather than to wantonness and reckless-
ness, and was undoubtedly based upon his belief that 
no injury was probable." Howard v. Howard 132 Cal. 
App. 124, 22 P2d 279, 281. Another driver neglected 
to inspect his truck after notice of a defective rear 
end, and while descending a 6 per cent grade at 20 
miles per hour, something suddenly gave way. The 
truck proceeded with motor compression. He lost con-
trol, became frantic, and the truck jumped the bank, 
overturned and the driver and his guest were both 
injured. It was held that no wilful misconduct was 
shown. Turner vs. Standard Oil, 134 Cal. App. 622, 
25 P2d 988. 
cc ( 3) It must be shown that (Csuch acs were done 
under circumstances disclosing know ledge, express or to 
be implied, that an injury to a guest will be a probable 
result." McLeod v. Dutton, supra (13 Cal. App. 2d 
545, 57 P2d 191). The factors necessary to prove wilful 
misconduct are ( 1) that the driver intentionally did 
something in driving that he should not have done or 
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( 2) that he failed to do what he should have done, 
under the circumstances express or implied "that an 
injury to a guest will be a probable result." Hall v. 
Mazzei, supra ( 14 Cal. App. 2d 48, 57 P2d 950); 
Turner v. Standard Oil supra. For an act to be wilful 
misconduct, it must be an intentional act with a knowl-
edge, that serious in jury is a probable result, or an 
intentional act with a wanton and reckless disregard 
of its possible result. Howard v. Howard, supra. USuch 
intent and knowledge of probable injury may not be 
inferred from the facts in every case showing an act or 
omission constituting negligence .... " Meek v. Fowler, 
3 Cal. 2d 420 at page 426, 45 P2d 194 at page 197. 
\Vhere excessive speed appears to be attributable to a 
lack of care and not to a disregard of the probable con-
sequences, the driver is not guilty of wilful misconduct. 
Lennon v. Woodbury, 3 Cal. App. 2d 595, 40 P2d 292. 
"The mere failure to perform a statutory duty is not, 
alone, wilful misconduct. . . . To constitute twilful 
misconduct' there must be actual knowledge ... of the 
peril to be apprehended from the failure to act ... 
to the end of averting injury." Wright v. Sellers, 25 
Cal. App. 2d 603, 608, 78 P2d 209, 212. 
( 7) Therefore, the defendant, though negligent, 
could not be said to have intended probable injury to 
his guests. They were congenial friends, enjoying to-
gether the harmony of a convivial evening; traveling 
to a place where they proposed to extend its delights. 
With no houses to the south; no traffic to reckon with; 
with a dangerous jog in the curb concealed from view 
by aeolian deposits; with no lines to guide, no signs 
or markin~s to warn of the lurking dangers, the slig~t­
est neglect might have resulted in disaster. But while 
it was a situation that might have required extraordinary 
care to insure ones own safety, there was nothing to 
indicate that defendant knew that injury to his guest 
would probably result from his thus driving along said 
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approach to said intersection. Turner v. Standard Oil, 
supra. Certainly, a jury's finding that he intended no 
such mischief or that he did not proceed wantonly is 
abundantly justified.'' 
There is another case that is practically identical with 
the facts that \Ve have in this case, but was civil in character 
and not criminal. As I said before, a criminal case should even 
be more favorable to my client, than a civil one. This case is 
Gill v. Hayes, 108 P2d 117, Oklahoma, 1940, where they 
applied the New Mexico law. The facts of this case were: That 
the plaintiff was a guest in the defendant's car. Plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant drove the car in the night time upon a 
curved pavement, 70 miles per hour, in violation of the maxi-
mum speed without being able to see curved condition of the 
road and while the same was damp, wet and slippery, without 
tires equipped with proper treads or chains and without proper 
brake adjustments. The car hit the curve, the brakes were 
applied and it rolled several times. Several other people were 
in the car, besides the plaintiff and defendant, who were going 
on a trip. The court said on page 120: 
"(2) Nearly all the courts passing upon this identi-
cal statute have held that the word "heedlessness" as 
there used is to be read in connection with c c reckless 
disregard of the rights of others" and that in order to 
create liability~ the acts of the operator causing the 
accident must be something beyond mere negligence; 
and something approaching wilful or wanton mis-
conduct. 
The only respect in which the attitude of one whose 
acts are in heedless and reckless disregard of the rights 
of others is less blameworthy than that of the inten-
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tional wrongdoer is that instead of affirmatively wish-
ing to injure another, he is merely willing to do so. 
The evidence in this case shows that plaintiff and 
defendant were friends of some years standing. They 
had taken a number of automobile trips together, 
sometimes the one and sometimes the other being 
((guest rider.'' There was riding with defendant, besides 
plaintiff, his wife, his sister and his cousin, all alike his 
guests. 
We would not hesitate to hold that there was evi-
dence sufficient to require submission to the jury were 
it only a question of defendant's negligence. 
( 3) Measured by the construction of every other 
court which has construed the statute we are unwilling 
to say that the evidence in this case, though sufficient 
to show negligence in its ordinary sense, was sufficient 
to show a willingness to inflict injury on plaintiff or 
any of his other guests. 
There is a California case with facts a good deal like ours, 
which is Katz v. Kuppin, 112 P2d 681, California 1941. The 
facts in that case are that plaintiff drove a coupe with two 
guests at 2 A.M. upon a wide paved boulevard. The weather 
was clear and dry and the moon bright and he was going in 
excess of 70 miles per hour. He hit a curve and ran off the 
road because of speed. The plaintiff claimed the accident was 
the result of defendant's wilfull misconduct. The court said 
on page 282, right hand column: 
(( ( 6) Wilful tnisconduct is not to be inferred from 
the circumstances detailed in this case. Where a motorist 
had been requested to reduce his speed, raced with 
another car at a speed exceeding 50 miles per hour 
on a foggy night, pulled to the wrong side of the 
road at a speed of 7 3 miles per hour, intentionally 
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disregarded the "slow" sign to pass his rival in the race, 
then collided with a third car crossing the highway, 
it was held that these facts, standing alone, did not 
constitute wilful misconduct. Under such circumstances, 
the record must further show that such acts were done 
under circumstances disclosing knowledge on the part 
of defendant that an injury to his guest would be a 
probable result. McLeod v. Dutton, 13 Cal. App. 2d 
545, 57 P2d 189. This and kindred authorities estab-
lish the law to be that, in the absence of proof of ( 1) 
a positive intention to injure his guests, or ( 2) his 
wanton disregard for their safety, the fact of his driving 
at an excessive speed on a dry, wide highway, free of 
traffic in the early hours of the morning, in the bright 
moonlight, even though objections were voiced to the 
rate of his travel, will not establish wilful misconduct. 
Newman v. Solt, 8 Cal. App. 2d 50, 47 P2d 289; 
Hall v. Mazzei, 14 Cal. App. 2d 48, 57 P2d, 948; 
Lennon v. Woodbury, 3 Cal. App. 2d 595, 40 P2d; 
Robertson v. Brown, 37 Cal. App. 2d 189, 99 P2d 288. 
( 7, 8) Admitting the truth of plaintiffs evidence, 
as we must (Marchetti v. Southern Pac. Co., 204 Cal. 
679, 269 P. 529) they did not establish wilful miscon-
duct on the part of the defendant. The facts are clear 
and from them only one inference can be drawn. 
Hence, the issue became one of law to be determined 
by the trial judge." 
While I have used cases involving the guest statute, we 
do have a Colorado case reported in 1956, Trujillo vs. People, 
292 P2d 980, that laid down the rule that: The same degree 
of negligence is required to sustain a charge of manslaughter 
as is necessary to support the recovery in an action for damages 
under automobile guest statute, the essential element in each 
instance being a wanton and wilful disregard of the rights 
and safety of others. 
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Consequently, I have to say that the complaint, as set 
out, when considered with the bill of particulars, did not in 
and of itself state an offense against the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL FOR 
F AlLURE TO PROVE A CAUSE OF ACTION OR ERRED 
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION NO. 1 FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS 
TO-WIT: 
(a) THAT THE 'fESTIMONY OF THE OFFICERS 
WAS CONFLICTING. 
(b) THAT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OFFI-
CERS PRESENTED AND PARTICULARLY AS TO MEAS-
UREMENTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN AT THE SCENE OF 
THE ACCIDENT WERE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO 
BE AS ALLEGED. 
The writer will take up (a) and (b) of Point II first: 
Officer Blair stated (Tr. 42-3): 
nA. After we walked back to the marks that we 
observed prior, I went over in my car and picked up a 
red crayon and the other officers remained there at the 
marks. I went back over, and to the best of our ability 
we marked those right at the very end where they 
appeared to start and where they finished, so that I 
could find them easier.·' 
nA. The two marks were the marks left by the 
right side wheels of an automobile." (Tr. 43-22) 
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"A. Yes, these marks were--they were two inches 
wide. 
Q. They. Now you say "they." How many of them 
were there? 
A. There were two marks. Two marks. They ap-
peared to be almost identical, except in length and-
Q. Almost identical except in length? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 44-3) 
"A. They were eight inches apart. 
Q. Eight inches apart. And could you describe or 
step to the board and draw it for the jury what you 
saw, or in other words to give the appearance of these 
lines? 
A. Refer to this as the curve and the south side of 
the road. This here is the south shoulder as the road 
proceeds east. These marks that I observed were located 
to the right side of the road or the south side of the 
road running parallel to one another." ( T r. 44-2 5) 
CCA. The right mark or the south mark, which was 
twenty inches longer in length and the inside-
Q. Twenty inches longer? 
A. I should say it started twenty inches prior to the 
second mark." (Tr. 62-19) 
"A. And the total lenght of that mark was 57-10. 
That's where it went off the road, with no further con-
tact with the mark on the road. (Tr. 62-27) 
etA. The other mark, as I say, was twenty inches-
started twenty inches prior-or after the first mark, 
was seventy-seven, six total contact with the road. 
(Tr. 63-4) 
"Q. Did you make any measurements with respect 
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to the mark that was inside or closer to the center of 
the highway then? 
A. It was measured, as I say, at the same time, 
measurements, this mark run parallel to this one. This 
one here was used in preference to this one for a 
particular reason. 
Q. Well, we're not interested in the reason. Just 
tell us what you did. 
A. The arc of this one was not figured, only this 
one, but there were measurements made between to 
show they were parallel and equal. 
Q. There were measurements made where? 
A. Measurements of the total length, also in relation 
to this one. That they were running parallel and the 
distance between them was the same, eight inches all 
the way through. 
Q. How many of those measurements did you make? 
A. The measurements across was periodic. I didn't 
go ten feet. I'd go probably two steps. Approximately 
ten feet. And I checked it periodically all the way 
through to see if it did vary. 
Q. Did it vary? 
A. No." (Tr. 95-2) 
The court's attention is called to the fact that the testimony 
is taken from the transcript given by Officer Blair on the marks 
that were supposed to be laid down. In summary, the right one 
sarts first and travels 57 feet 10 inches before it leaves the 
oiled surface. The other, the left one, starts 20 inches up the 
road and 8 inches left and goes 77 feet 6 inches up the road 
before it leaves the oiled road. They are exactly 8 inches apart, 
according to Officer Blair, and this parallel distance continues 
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all the way through and the officer determined that both lines 
made the same kind of curve so he determined the arc of just 
the right line on the pure assumption that it would make no 
difference which line they used. On cross examination he was 
asked: 
"Q. You want them to believe that these two lines 
as they proceeded, proceeded right parallel and they 
had the same degree of curve, both of them? 
A. Yes, sir." (Tr. 129-4) 
··Q. Now if I understand you, you only measured 
the right wheel? 
A. For the middle ordinant, yes. 
Q. You didn't measure the left? 
A. No. 
Q. You felt that it was exactly the same because 
the lines paralleled each other ? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And they continued to parallel until it came 
right up and run off the cement? 
A. Yes, sir." (T'r. 130-5) 
It was then that he and Officer Lee were asked to plat 
on a large piece of paper on the floor in front of the jury, 
defendant's exhibit No. 21, to a scale of one inch equals one 
foot. 
The officers drew a straight line on a long piece of paper 
(Tr. 131) which would represent the south edge of an oil 
strip of road, if the road were in a straight line running east 
and west. The officers were then requested to step to the board 
and on their own exhibit No. 14 made by them of the accident 
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scene, they laid a ruler parallel and along the south edge of the 
oiled road at the point where their exhibit shows the car 
wheels leaving the road. The ruler being straight could not 
follow the curve of the road, but would represent the south 
side of the road if the road were straight. Then from this 
straight line they measured left to the beginning marks that 
they had platted on their Exhibit No. 14 and the distance 
scaled 12 feet. They were then requested to put the first distance 
reported 57 feet 10 inches on the larger scale (Tr. 135-28) to 
a point where it would cross off the edge of the oil. This was 
the right rear tire and a straight line was drawn and then 
(Tr. 136-137-138) the four inch ordinate was laid off on a 
cord of 55 feet of the first part of this line. Next the other 
purported tire mark was platted on the big scale (Tr. 138-
139) and when they platted it starting 20 inches further up 
the highway and 8 inches left of the first mark, if it remained 
parallel and the distance was 77 feet 6 inches where it was 
supposed to leave the oiled surface we found it was utterly 
impossible for it would put the nose of the car down into the 
barrow pit (Tr. 139-19). The front wheel is approximately 
10 feet in front of the back wheel and if it stayed upon the 
oiled surface and did not leave the oil for an additional 22 
feet, see Exhibit No. 21, then it would be physically impossible 
for the two tire marks to be parallel. In summary, we could 
say: The left front tire mark made by the right front tire, 
if it stays parallel and 8 inches to the rear of the right rear 
wheel for 57 feet 10 inches as testified by Officer Blair (Tr. 
95-13-15) would have to leave the oiled road just a little 
further up the road. Just a little over eight inches from where 
the rear tire left the road, or the two marks were not parallel. 
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Consequently the marks would have to continue to get wider 
apart with the rear of the car 1noving further to the right until 
it goes off the road and the front of the car staying on for 
approximately 22 more feet. 
The officer, after further cross examination, was asked 
a question about the wheel base of this car, which was actually 
119 inches or one inch short of ten feet and then was asked: 
ceQ. So that the front wheel, as it lays down its 
mark, is ten feet ahead of the rear wheel, is it not? 
A. Approximately. 
Q. And if it were right up here uniform and laying 
down a mark and on the same curve that you have, 
if there were ten feet on it, and if it were on the same 
curve right up to the fifty-five feet, it would have to 
be on the gravel, would it not, at the time the rear 
one laid the same mark down? 
A. That would be difficult to answer. If you're 
figuring the road as perfectly true, that may be right. 
Q. Sure. 
A. If the edge of the road is perfectly straight. 
Q. But I take it from your statement now that they 
were laying these marks down and they were traveling, 
and if those marks were right there when you got up 
to fifty-five feet, that front of that car has got to be 
out across the oil on the side, has it not? With ten 
feet more length? 
A. I don't know." (Tr. 153-16) 
I believe the officer at this point was telling the truth 
when he said CCI don't know." The recordings of the measure-
ments taken show beyond all doubt that there was a grave 
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error in them some place, and with this error so apparent the 
court should not have allowed the jury to speculate upon it, 
and to use these figures as the basis for Dr. Wood's testimony. 
POINT II 
(c) THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS, A PHYSICIST 
OF THE USU, WAS BASED UPON A FALSE PREMISE, 
TO-WIT: THAT THE MARKS WERE LAID DOWN 
WHILE THE CAR OF THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVEL-
lNG FREE OF SKIDS OR BRAKES ON THE CIRCUM-
FERENCE OF A PERFECT CIRCLE FOR A DISTANCE OF 
A FIFTY FIVE FOOT CORD ON SAID CIRCUMFERENCE. 
(d) THAT THE TESTIMONY OF DR. WOODS WAS 
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND CAUSED THE JURY TO 
BE INFLUENCED AND SPECULATE ON ITS VERDICT. 
Both points will be covered in the argument at the same time. 
To set this case up for the physicist some groundwork 
had to be laid and of course it is this 55 foot cord on a pur-
ported circle that the officer was trying to work into. On page 
182 of the transcript and beginning with line 2, we have: 
nQ. Well, you were measuring the outside mark 
on the theory that I'm going to establish the diameter 
of a circle, are you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're fixing that diameter in regard to the 
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The officer was further interrogated as to whether or not 
the car had to be travelling this circle, and as to whether or 
not braking, letting up on the gas, or even slight braking 
would have an effect. Then on page 183 of the transcript he 
was asked if he subscribed to the findings of the Traffic Accident 
Investigation Manual for Police, put out by the Traffic Insti· 
tute of Northwestern University. Then on page 184, line 23 
of the transcript, we have: 
MR. MANN: Article five-two-four-fifty, I'm giving 
you, page 433, and I'm reading in the middle of the 
article on the left side column of the two-column 
page: CCI£ brakes are applied even a little the vehicle 
will slide at a lower speed, because both the curve and 
the brakes tend to make it slide. If the skidding occurs 
only when brakes are applied, the estimate of critical 
speed has little meaning." Do you subscribe to that 
theory? 
A. I wouldn't attempt to argue with the book." 
Consequently we have this, there are two marks left, both 
on the right side of the vehicle. The front tire mark is laid 
down to the left of the rear tire mark. We know nothing about 
the position of the other two tires. The officer was asked in 
transcript 189 line 16: 
ceQ. And can you say that if a car travels down the 
road and there's a slight mark with the right wheel, 
it won't show up in a photograph at night, that the 
left wheel is off the ground ? 
A. That would still be my assumption, yes. 
Q. Thafs a plain assumption, isn't it? 
A. Thafs my opinion, yes. 
Q. Just speculation, isn't it? 
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A. I wouldn't hardly say it was speculation. 
Q. Well-
MR. CALDERWOOD: He asked him the ques-
tion and got his answer. I object to the repetition. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Q. You weren't in the car, were you? 
A. The car that was damaged? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't see the accident? 
A. I sure didn't. 
Q. You just saw some marks after? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you want to conclude that the left wheels 
were off the ground 
THE COURT: Off the-
Q. Off the oil. 
A. As I say, I do not know. There were no marks 
visible. Whether they were off or not I don't know. 
Q. And they could have been on? 
A. It's possible. I don't know. There were no marks 
to indicate that they were.'' 
Dr. Wood was later brought on as the expert witness, and 
over defendant's objections and commenced to tell about certain 
tests on the vehicle at the USU campus. These tests included 
the turning of the vehicle at a sudden turn laying down some 
marks upon the highway, and the taking of certain measure-
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ments to one of the tire marks laid down under said tests. 
On page 278 of the transcript, line 22, we have: 
"Q. When you speak of a cord of the first and 
the last, which wheel did you follow to establish that 
cord? 
A. The right front, I believe it was. 
Q. Right front? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you follow the right rear wheel? 
A. I didn't think that was necessary, because by 
observation these were parallel, and parallelness can 
be detected quite accurately. 
Q. Which wheel made the biggest arc? 
A. Which wheel made the bigger arc? 
Q. Yep. 
A. I believe it was the right rear. 
Q. Made the bigger arc? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, doctor-
A. I don't know. I say I believe it was the--
Q. Now you've been teaching physics all these years 
and you don't know which wheel makes the bigger 
arc? 
A. The arc that we measured was the one nearest 
the center of the curve. 
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Q. Well, then was your test effective? You've got 
two arcs there, haven't you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And one is made by the front wheel and one by 
the back? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And they have to be in certain positions, don't 
they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say you measured the smaller or the 
larger? 
A. We measured the smaller one. 
Q. And you say you thought that was the front 
wheel? 
A. I thought so, yes. I didn't check it. 
Q. (Drawing on the blackboard) Well, now, this 
car has wheels in the front and it has wheels on the 
back, doesn't it? That's your measurement. 
A. Yes. 
Q. The black wheels run throughout a solid axle, 
don't they? 
A. That's right. 
Q. They can't turn? 
A. That's right. 
Q. The front wheel has to turn? 
A. Which is front and which is back? 
Q. The car going in that direction (drawing). Now, 
when that car starts to make a turn, it does it on the 
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bases where we're going to find the center of that 
radius in relation to a horizontal line? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that's run through the back wheels, isn't it, 
the solid part? 
A. If we're measuring those, yes. 
Q. Now when those front wheels turn and we 
decide to determine the way that car is going, we create 
a triangle "~j~}: the use of that car as a base, do we 
not? 
A. This can be done, yes. 
Q. Well, that is done, isn't it, tn any curve, any 
driving of that automobile ? 
A. I don't follow that at all. 
Q. Well, if this car starts to turn and comes around 
in this circle (illustrating on the blackboard), these 
here are going to go this way, are they not? 
A. Yes, I believe they would. 
Q. And the front wheel has always got to be to 
the right of· the rear wheels, is that correct, so we get 
it in the record? 
A. Yes~ I presume that's correct. 
Q. So that all the tests that you made up here, doctor, 
would be that the arc of the front wheel was the out-
side and the arc of the rear wheel was inside; is that 
correct? 
A. Will you state the question again? 
Q. Well, any turning of the curve that you made 
up here on your test, the arc of the--the curve that the 
outside front wheel would make would be outside of 
the curve or the outside of the back right wheel? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. Just like I've drawn it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If I take it out and drive it in the snow it will 
do that same thing, won't it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And the reason for it is that we have old tri-
angle question. We start out here with this as the 
base, this is the right side and this is the hypotenuse 
and right out here to the front wheels is going to be 
a longer distance than the point where we hit the center 
of the radius, isn't it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, doctor, do you know whether or not this 
curve that these people have brought in to you was 
made by the right wheel or the left wheel and which 
side they had them on ? 
A. I was not concerned with that. 
Q. Now if they have the wrong wheel on the wrong 
side they're in a skid rather than in a-
A. Oh, certainly not, no. You haven't made this 
a skid. 
Q. No, I've done it just like you've drawn it. 
MR. CALDERWOOD: Who drew it? 
A. I didn't draw it. 
Q. Just like I've drawn it, and I've drawn it just like 
a car will turn without skidding. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, if I'm going to have this tire on the inside, 
I've got to have my car pointed the other way when 
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I start this circle. So that this tire will be on the out-
side and I've got to skid rather than drive it, have I 
not, to have the rear wheel outside of the front one? 
A. If you want to set up those conditions, I pre-
sume you'd do that." 
Consequently I would say this, that Dr. Wood came in 
with only one thought in mind, that is: The assumption that 
the car was travelling, speeding aorund the outside of a circle, 
not skidding in any way, tra veiling exact! y as a car would 
if it is being driven not if it is in any type of skid. He admits 
upon the blackboard after the matter has been brought to his 
mind for the first time, that the front wheel in any kind of a 
turn, due to the fact that the turning is made from the front 
wheels alone and is turned through solid back wheels that a 
triange is formed, and that the outside front wheel will make 
a larger circle than the outside rear wheel, so that if the car 
is traveling freely, but not skidding the front wheel must be 
on the outside of the circle and not be inside as the officers 
had testified. 
From a check of the transcript you will discover that the 
doctor went on and testified, basing his theory entirely upon 
the fact that the car was speeding; travelling around a curve 
and travelling at such a speed as to lay down tire marks with 
the outside tires from speed and not from skids. The court 
allowed him, over the defendant's objections (Tr. 292, line 17) 
to testify as to the speed of this vehicle, based upon testimony 
and marks which show conclusively that the marks were either 
from skids or brakes or both. One line 24, page 292 of the 
transcript he testified 110 miles an hour as the minimum speed 
and he sets out his theory (Tr. 293, line 27) and gives the 
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radius of the circle (Tr. 296, line 18) as 1134 feet. He admits 
(Tr. 297) that if the officer made a slight mistake in measuring 
the ordinate of the arc, that the radius could be reduced 200 
feet by one inch error. He admits (Tr. 300 line 2) that the 
radius of the curve actually on the road was 717 feet. He 
admitted (Tr. 301) that with the shorter radius as compared 
to a larger radius, that a car travelling at the same speed 
would lay a mark down quicker on the shorter radius of the 
curve yet that there were no marks on this particular curve, 
which has been negotiated practically to its conclusion with 
a radius of 717 feet until all of a sudden some slight marks 
show up and he tells us that the radius of that mark is 1134 
feet. Consequently we would have to conclude that in this 
particular case, the driver went around a sharp curve without 
leaving a mark and all of a sudden went into a big wide open 
curve and left a mark. Common sense tells us these marks 
made by tires on one side which are crossed from normal driving 
could only happen from one thing, and this is the skid, or 
brake pedal (Tr. 302). 
The dcxtor was further examined (Tr. 303 line 13): 
ttQ. Now I've got to go back to that formula, 
doctor, if that's the case. The formula that you gave 
me the other day, you figured 133 miles, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you figure a hundred ten-
A. Now refresh my memory on this. 
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Q. And you brought a formula forward, and in that 
formula, on page sixty-eight, line twenty, you testify 
as to speed of that automobile, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you brought a formula forward, and in that 
formula, on page sixty-eight, line twenty, you testify 
as to speed of that automobile, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time you had 133 miles? 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. And they asked you this question: tcNow, assum-
ing, doctor, that the radius, or curvature, of a tire 
mark by a motor vehicle is 1134 and so on . . . " and 
what is that opinion? Answer: 133 miles per hour." 
That's correct, isn't it? 
A. There were some other conditions associated 
with that, I think. 
Q. Well, you did give that speed, 133 miles an hour, 
didn't you? 
A. There were some other conditions. 
Q. You can answer my question. You gave that as 
the speed? 
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, I object to it as 
irrelevant and immaterial. It's not the same form of 
question. 
MR. MANN: Well, we've now had our speed 
reduced to 110 and it was 133 over there. 
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, I object to this as 
immaterial argument to the jury. The factors which 
the doctor took under consideration are not shown 
to be the same. 
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THE COURT: You'll have to prove that. He 
can ask him if he testified to that over there. 
MR. CALDERWOOD: Well, it's immaterial what 
he testified to. 
MR. MANN: It is not immaterial. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
A. This was one of nine values that I reported, I 
believe. 
Q. You even got it up to 160 miles over there, didn't 
you? 
A. That's right, yes." 
There was diligent cross examination thereafter as to 
shifting of weights; the various speeds and how he reached them 
and in transcript 309 line21 , we have this question: 
HQ. No, I'm asking you. I don't care whether they 
asked you. You don't know yourself whether there was 
any weight on the left wheels touching the cement; 
is that it? 
A. No, I don't know whether there was any weight 
or not. 
Q. And you don't know whether there was any 
weight tipped up on the car so that it was on two 
wheels and the car was tipped up at forty-five degrees 
or something of that nature? 
A. No. 
Q. So that you have to assume whether the car was 
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The defendant employed a Mr. Keith A. Hansen, a pro-
fessional engineer, to make a complete survey of the scene of 
the accident. His qualifications are set out on page 364 of the 
transcript. He was asked if he could plat the two lines that 
the state were relying on on his Exhibit No. 36 (Tr. 367-
368) and he advised that you could not keep them parallel 
and still cause them to go off the cement at the points designated 
without some sudden change taking place. He was asked to plot 
on his exhibit a circle with a radius of 1134 feet (Tr. 371) 
through the purported tire marks and see if that course were 
followed if the same would follow the road, which it would 
not. One of the officers had suggested that the car cut corners, 
that is, did not follow the true radius of the road, but went 
from the outside to the inside and back to the outside. Con-
sequently I had the engineer plot a course on his exhibit (Tr. 
3 72-3) with variations of travel and had a radius varying 
between 663 and 758 feet as compared with Dr. Woods of 
1134 feet. He was also asked about the position of tire travel, 
in regard to the front and rear wheels on the right side of a 
car travelling in a circle, with a radius of 78 feet (Tr. 374) 
and he said the right front tire would be to the left of the 
right rear tire eight inches. The position of these tires is just 
opposite than in our case. He was also asked about the position 
of the tires of a car travelling in a circle with a radius of 1134 
feet (Tr. 374) and the right front tire would be approximately 
one inch on the outside of the right rear tire. He was asked, 
(Tr. 3 75-27): 
nQ. From a mathematical equation, Mr. Hansen, 
can you compute the travel of a vehicle with a radius 
of 1134 feet and have the back wheel traveling eight 
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inches on the outside of the front wheel, for the 
whole distance, without assuming-
A. Not without assuming something. 
Q. And what do you mean by that? 
A. In order for the rear wheels to get on the outside 
of the front wheels, some forces had to act on that 
vehicle or that body to change its position. I would 
have to assume that the force had acted and then was 
remaining constant throughout the path. 
Q. And held it there? 
A. And held it there, yes." 
See a further explanation in transcription 387-388. 
The professional engineer for the defendant made up to 
scale a plastic shape of an automobile 17¥2 feet long with holes 
in the approximate location of the tires and the tires the 
approximate width of the automobile. A demonstration was 
made on Exhibit 21 by placing a pencil in the position of the 
two right wheels ,Tr. 407) and moving it along the course 
that the Officer Blair had testified that the car had taken. The 
front wheel would of necessity reach the edge of the oiled road 
first, and in order for it to stay on it would have to make a 
sudden change in direction with the front so that it would 
go up the hard surfaced road another approximate 22 feet. 
Consequently the testimony of Dr. Woods was based upon 
a false premise to-wit: That the car was traveling on the outside 
of a circle with a radius of 1134 feet without the side skid 
or brake being applied; that it held that course while traveling 
in a normal manner and that the marks left were the result of 
side pressure created from an even speed being held uniformly 
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throughout the distance; that the speed would vary from 110 
to 160 miles per hour. That the many controversies in the 
testimony of the officers and the measurements taken together 
with the fact that the car, as it left the oiled edge, was going 
into a right side bank (Tr. 79-28) prove that the permise was 
false and full of speculation. This spirit of speculation became 
the prevalent theme before the court and the jury took it with 
them to the jury room. 
POINT II 
(e) THAT 'fHERE IS NO TESTIMONY IN THE REC-
ORD THAT THE DEFENDANT EVER EXCEEDED THE 
SPEED OF 65 MILES PER HOUR IN A POSTED 60 MILE 
DAY SPEED ZONE AND THEN SUCH SPEED WAS ONLY 
MOMENTARY. THAT SPEED ALONE OF THIS SLIGHT 
VARIATION FROM THE POSTED SPEED IS NOT nRECK-
LESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY OF OTHERS." 
(f) THAT THE ACCIDENT WAS THE RESULT OF 
A MOMENTARY INDECISION OF THE DRIVER AFTER 
HE REACHED GRAVEL DEPOSITS NEGLIGENTLY LEFT 
BY HIGHWAY OFFICIALS IN THE "Y" OF FORKING 
ROADS AS TO WHICH WAY THE ROAD WAS GOING. 
THAT SAID ACT WAS AT MOST NEGLIGENCE AND 
NOT HEEDLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF 
OTHERS. 
(g) THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD OF A HEEDLESS DISREGARD OF THE SAFETY 
OF OTHERS IN THE DRIVING OF THE DEFENDANT. 
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I have set out in detail in the statement of facts the state-
ment of Mr. Berchtold that he never once looked at the speed-
ometer. That he did not believe that it was over sixty five 
miles per hour, if it were that fast. Officer Bair claimed that 
when he first talked with Mr. Berchtold, that Berchtold hin1 
that he was going seventy, but that in his written statement he 
said 65 miles. When Mr. Berchtold was placed on the stand 
he was asked if he made a statement to Officer Bair, about 
driving seventy miles per hour and he said: (Tr. 424-11) tcNo. 
I says, I don't think I could have possibly been going more 
than seventy miles an hour. I never stated the speed of seventy 
miles an hour.'' 
The evidence is uncontradicted that up to just a moment 
or two, before the accident, they were driving slowly. That 
one of the passengers said the other girl would be in bed 
if they didn't pick up the speed. That the passengers were 
looking at the Thiokol badge of the Forrest boy, which was in 
their hands, and this badge was found at the scene of the 
accident. That it was just an ordinary night where three young 
people were very happy the moment before, but when they 
came down across the bridge into a division of the roads 
where one went left and the other right at slight angles from 
each other, with loose gravel out in center of the fork, that 
just one moment's hesitation tnade it so that the car reached 
the loose gravel before a decision to turn left was made. Then 
either from the loose gravel, the touching of the brakes, the 
turning of the steering wheel in connection with these, the 
car skidded own the embankment and struck a telephone pole 
and the scene of joy and merriment changed to one of tragedy. 
There is no recklessness and show -off -ness. There is a slight 
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picking up of speed with indecision and perhaps poor judgment 
being exercised, after the loose gravel was struck and the car 
turned to the left. Where, under all of these stated facts, was 
the conduct showing a marked disregard for the safety of 
others, as required under State vs. Adams, 125 P2d 430? 
There is none. 
POINT II 
(h) THAT THE COURT, AFTER ALLOWING HIGH-
LY SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED TO 
THE JURY, WAS OBLIGATED TO TAKE SAID CASE 
FROM THE JURY TO PROHIBIT THEM FROM SPECU-
LATING IN MAKING THEIR DECISION. 
The court in instruction No. 6 (R. 30) in the last para-
graph said: 
"You are not to indulge in speculation or guesses 
as to the cause of the accident, or how or in what 
manner it originated, but you are to determine this 
cause solely upon the evidence presented. If you are 
required to resort to speculation as to any factual issue 
to be resolved by you, then reasonable doubt exists 
in your mind as to the facts, and you should resolve 
that issue in favor of the defendant." 
It is the contention of counsel for the defendant that 
the court understood the law and instructed the jury that they 
should not speculate. But this is like locking the barn door 
after the horse has been stolen. If Dr. Wood's testimony was 
stricken then they had no case whatsoever to stand on, as to 
speeds as set out in the bill of particulars, when they said in 
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excess of seventy miles per hour. However, with Dr. Wood's 
testimony based upon assumptions, speculations and false 
measurements, it set the stage for the jury to carry on in the 
same manner. No amount of instruction could have warded 
it away. We are in a small town; feelings are high; two people 
lost their lives; someone should pay and an excuse is all that 
is needed. It takes four days to try the case but only forty 
minutes to walk out and come back with a verdict. Conse-
quently, I say that the court saw the situation and he should 
have taken it away from the jury and directed a verdict of 
not guilty. 
POINT III 
THAT THE 1RIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
GIVE, IN ITS ENTIRETY, DEFENDANT'S INSTRUC-
TION NO. 10 FOR THE REASON THAT SAID INSTRUC-
TION IS A TRUE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND THE 
JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
UPON IT. 
Instruction No. 10 was requested for the reason that at 
the present time many jurors do not understand the difference 
between negligence and the reckless disregard for the safety 
of others, which means wilful or wanton misconduct. It was 
prejudicial error to fail to give this instruction as requested. 
It would have then made it possible for counsel to point out 
clearly to the jury the difference in this criminal proceeding. 
When the court refused to give it, it prejudiced the rights 
of the defendant. See Schulz v. Fible, 48 NE 2d 899. 
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CONCLUSION 
We believe sincerely that the defendant was not charged 
properly under the information as modified by the bill of par-
ticulars. That the testimony of the officers was conflicting as 
well as their measurements. That the testimony of Dr. Woods 
was based upon a false premise and caused great speculation. 
That the case should have been taken from the jury and the 
defendant found not guilty. That the defendant was denied 
a substantial right when the court refused to give the jury 
defendant's instruction No. 10. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VI ALTER G. MANN of 
MANN AND HADFIELD 
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